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funding of campaigns. However, they are just as persuasive in intimating that
cultural capital would significantly bias who would run for office and who




Arco I. Timmermans, High Politics in the Low
Countries: An Empirical Study of Coalition Agreements
in Belgium and The Netherlands. Aldershot: Ashgate,
2003. €45.00 (hbk), vii + 168 pp. ISBN 0 7546 1559 6.
Although consensus democracy remains a dominant concept in political science
more than 30 years after it was introduced by several observers of political
systems in Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, its working has
never been adequately explained. This is mainly due to the fact that two of its
characteristics, broad elite cooperation and informal (or even secret) policy
bargaining, have never been defined, operationalized and measured unambigu-
ously. Moreover, (neo-)institutional theories are still unable to clearly differen-
tiate between formal and informal institutions, let alone to analyse the
functioning and effect of the latter. A study into this ‘black box’ of consensus
democracy is therefore long overdue.
In a recent attempt, Timmermans has tried to get a scientific foot in this
particular door by exploring the role and effects of coalition agreements
between political parties taking office together in Belgium and The Netherlands.
He argues that the manner and extent to which ‘controversial issues’ are dealt
with in the first crucial stage of government formation determines the policy
payoffs that parties achieve during the coalition; which, in turn, explains the
survival of the ensuing governments. The main findings of this study are that:
periods of coalition formation are important moments for policy formulation
at the national level; coalition formation has an agenda-setting function which
is used by parties as a mechanism for conflict prevention (hence the increasing
length of coalition agreements); coalition agreements are also used to limit the
scope of the government’s actions, not only to make substantive policy
decisions; and that mechanisms of mutual control in a coalition are crucial to
its survival.
After a very short overview of research into coalitions, Timmermans tries to
come to grips with the functions and effects of coalition agreements. Unfortu-
nately, no clear conceptual and analytic framework is developed before the study
moves on to five case studies of coalition governments in Belgium in the 1970s
and The Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s. In the case studies, Timmermans
first analyses the types of arrangements in different policy fields by differentiat-
ing between explicit and implicit compromises (following Luebbert), the latter
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also being subdivided into procedural and substantive types of arrangements.
However, Timmermans does not provide a distinct operationalization of the
differences between controversial and non-controversial issues, nor what makes
an arrangement procedural or substantive. Explicit compromises are considered
substantive and detailed, while implicit compromises are defined as agreements
to disagree and ‘may consist of procedural arrangements such as postponements
or statements which are sufficiently general or vague that none of the parties
sees its preferences violated’ (p. 24). On page 36, the author even confuses the
reader further by defining explicit compromises as ‘arrangements in coalition
agreements that contain clear and doable substantive intentions’. And further
down: ‘Substantive implicit compromises are much less specific, and for this
reason they are less committing’.
Are explicit and implicit substantive compromises now still mutually exclusive?
Are implicit agreements undoable by definition? How do we determine that
implicit agreements have been implemented as Timmermans concludes on pages
51, 68, 104 and 126? And what are the criteria for determining whether an
arrangement is implicit or explicit, more or less specific, substantive or pro-
cedural, doable and implemented or not? None of these conceptual issues are
adequately addressed. While the author states that his analysis requires that
these key concepts are well defined, they are dealt with in less than two pages.
Chapter 3 also discusses some conceptual elements, but these are not taken on
board when the key concepts are briefly summarized in Chapter 4. In sum, the
book clearly lacks a chapter that explains the author’s approach to key concepts
and categorizations. In terms of the empirical analysis, it remains unclear in
what manner the manifest and substantive conflicts that have been identified,
and why certain parts of the coalition agreement documents, are considered less
relevant. How, then, can we establish what level of conflict existed between the
coalition partners on each of the policy issues?
A similar lack of conceptual and analytic clarity is found in the analysis of
the effects of the coalition agreements. Again, on page 23, Timmermans argues
that only certain sections of coalition agreements are relevant as some issues are
simply included in these documents to meet the expectations of followers or the
general public, while parties do not care too much about them. Without an
empirical or theoretical foundation for this rather bold claim, Timmermans only
focuses on issues that were controversial during government formation in order
to establish which policies have been implemented.
Problems also arise with the case selection. First, the author introduces a
substantial amount of extraneous variation by analysing cases from different
decades in the two countries (the 1970s in Belgium and the 1980s and 1990s in
The Netherlands). Secondly, according to Timmermans, the case selection is
based on the ‘variation in coalition performance, that is the duration of govern-
ments and their reputation in policy making, of which implementation of the
coalition agreement is a part’ (p. 32), while party composition (coalition size
and ideological profile) is also taken into account. While, in both countries,
governments with varying lifespans are studied, it is not clear why three cases
from The Netherlands are selected and only two from Belgium. In addition, only
five party governments are studied in Belgium, while in The Netherlands only
two and three party coalitions were included. Including durable Dutch five party
coalitions would have been possible (the Den Uyl government of 1973–77, for
PA RT Y  P O L I T I C S  1 1 ( 5 )
644
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012ppq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
example) as well as durable Belgian coalitions that only included Christian
democratic and social democratic parties (the first Dehaene government of
1992–95). And why not include the fifth Martens government of Christian
democrats and liberals as a Belgian equivalent to the first Dutch Lubbers govern-
ment? How did the author establish the ideological profile (the level of polar-
ization between the coalition partners)? Coupled with the weakly developed
analytical framework, this imbalance in the case selection has serious conse-
quences for the external validity for the findings, which is problematic in an
exploratory and theory-generating case study.
Timmermans has attempted to fill boldly one of the serious gaps in political
science at the interface of formal and informal institutions. In order to make
institutionalism more dynamic (not regarding institutions as a given but as
constantly changing and developing parameters of political behaviour) and
more empirical we need to develop concepts and theories for analysing political
phenomena such as coalition formations. During these formation processes,
coalition agreements are made in an ‘institutionalised extra-institutional arena’,
largely behind closed doors, and in various stages in which many actors are
involved. Since most of us will never sit at the negotiating table, political
scientists have to find ways to peek behind these closed doors so that we can
better understand the process of policy formation, explain cabinet duration and
observe important aspects of political party behaviour.
André Krouwel
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (eds), Governing as
New Labour: Policy and Politics Under Blair.
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004. £16.99 (pb.), xiii + 261 pp.
ISBN 1 4039 X.
This book surveys the whole of Labour’s first term of office and the first half of
its second term with the object of assessing the claim that New Labour has
embarked on the modernization of social democracy in Britain (p. viii). The
book inevitably considers how far the Government has succeeded in matching
its reform programme with its stated objectives. The 13 chapters cover policy
areas such as: the economy, welfare, public services, constitutional reform,
foreign and European affairs, and the work of the Home Office, as well as such
matters as Labour’s electoral base, its intra-party politics and its relationship
with the trade unions and the media. There is also a brief discussion comparing
New Labour with some of its continental counterparts.
New Labour famously insisted on the need for two terms to achieve its key
policy objectives. This now looks a trifle optimistic in areas such as welfare state
reform, public services and infrastructural modernization. New Labour assumes
that social change and changes in voting behaviour have made ‘Middle England’
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